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SEEKING A RIGHT TO APPOINTED COUNSEL IN CIVIL 
CASES IN MARYLAND 
Stephen H. Sachs t 
Keynote Address given at 
The University of Baltimore Law Review 
Symposium on April 5, 2007 
I. INTRODUCTION 
My thanks to the University of Baltimore Law Review for inviting 
me to give the keynote address at this symposium on "Civil 
Gideon"-the right to appointed counsel in civil proceedings. I am 
particularly pleased to appear with distinguished panelists who 
continue to play central roles in the development of this vital issue. 
On August 7, 2006, the House of Delegates of the American Bar 
Association (ABA) unanimously approved a groundbreaking 
resolution supporting the right to counsel for low income persons in 
civil cases impacting basic needs. 1 
My fellow panelists and I will undoubtedly be discussing the huge 
significance of the ABA resolution in the course of the afternoon. I 
want to provide a local context for the discussion by focusing on one 
case-Frase v. Barnhart. 2 I do so for several reasons. 
First, it is the principal effort, so far, to secure the right here in 
Maryland. What better place to discuss it than at this outstanding 
school of law? 
Second, we came damned close to winning. 
Third, it is a chance to sketch our legal theories, some of which are 
unique to Maryland. 
t Mr. Sachs is a member of the Maryland Bar; of counsel to Wilmer, Cutler, Pickering, 
Hale & DOff; and previously served as United States Attorney for the District of 
Maryland (1967-1970) and Attorney General of Maryland (1979-1987). He argued 
the case of Frase v. Barnhardt, 379 Md. 100,840 A.2d 114 (2003), in the Court of 
Appeals of Maryland. He delivered this keynote address, which has been slightly 
edited and annotated for publication, at the University of Baltimore's inaugural 
symposium on AprilS, 2007. 
I. See American Bar Association Task Force on Access to Civil Justice, ABA 
Resolution on Right to Counsel, 15 TEMP. POL. & CIv. RTS. L. REV. 507, available at 
http://www.abanet.org/legalservices/sc1aid/downloads/06A 112A.pdf. 
2. 379 Md. 100,840 A.2d 114 (2003). 
5 
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And fourth, but most important, it is a chance to introduce you to 
Deborah Frase, to put a human face on a cause that is not mere 
theory ... to try to convey what it is like-in the alien world of the 
law-to face the loss of your child-alone-without "the guiding 
hand of counsel." 3 
II. THE FRASE CASE 
My co-counsel and I represented Deborah Frase, the appellant in 
Frase v. Barnhart,4 a child custody case decided by the Court of 
Appeals of Maryland in December, 2003. 5 Deborah Frase won. 6 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland held that because she was a fit 
parent, it was error for the lower court to condition her continued 
custody of her two-year-old son on bi-weekly visitation at the home 
of the custody-seeking Barnharts; and on her application to a 
transitional shelter; and on continued review hearings before a 
judicial master. 7 
The court's ruling was based on the Supreme Court's recent 
decision in Troxel v. Granville,8 a grandparent visitation case, which 
established the constitutionally mandated presumption that a fit 
parent knows best what is in the child's best interest. 9 A four-judge 
majority of the Court of Appeals of Maryland did not reach our 
contention that Ms. Frase had been entitled to court-appointed 
counsel. They said that the issue had become moot. 10 Three judges 
concurred in the majority's disposition of the custody issue, but 
would have reached the right to counsel issue. II Moreover, they 
would have held that Ms. Frase was constitutionally entitled to 
appointed counsel. 12 
We were, of course, delighted that our client won her case and 
heartened by the concurring opinion. But I was left with the feeling 
that with respect to our cherished right to counsel issue, we had 
tossed up an appellate air ball. 
* * * 
3. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 u.s. 335, 345 (1963). 
4. Frase, 379 Md. at 102,840 A.2d at 115. 
5. Id. at 100,840 A.2d at 114. 
6. Id. at 128-29,840 A.2d at 131. 
7. /d. at 121-22, 125,840 A.2d at 126, 128-29. 
8. 530 U.S. 57 (2000). 
9. See id. at 63. 
10. See Frase, 379 Md. at 103,840 A.2d at 115. 
II. See id. at 129,840 A.2d at 131 (Cathell, J., concurring). 
12. /d. at 141,840 A.2d at 138. 
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I admire Deborah Frase. She is in a class with some of my other 
heroines-like the real Karen Silkwood 13 and the fictional Norma 
Rae. 14 
When Deb Frase, then 29 and a resident of Caroline County, 
Maryland, was arrested on a year-old bench warrant for possession 
and intent to distribute three ounces of marijuana, her mother, Diane 
Keys, who was a traveling nurse-and with whom Deb had an 
extraordinarily contentious relationship--ignored Deb's instructions. 
She placed Deb's youngest son, two-year-old Brett Michael, with 
Cynthia and Curtis Barnhart, whose only relationship with the Frase 
family was that Curtis was the leader of the Boy Scout troop of which 
Deb's oldest child was a member. 15 
Deb Frase pled guilty to the marijuana charge and was sentenced 
by Talbot County circuit court judge William Home to time served-
eight weeks. 16 Upon release, she retrieved Brett Michael, but the 
Barnharts-who had known Brett Michael for all of six weeks-
immediately filed a complaint for custody. They were represented by 
retained counsel. Deb Frase could not afford counsel. Although 
financially eligible, she was turned down by various legal services 
programs because they were understaffed and overworked. 17 She 
requested appointment of counsel at least four times, in vain, during 
the proceedings below. 18 
In two days of hearings before the judicial master in Caroline 
County, Deb Frase hung tough. She called witnesses from social 
service agencies, all of whom testified that she was a loving and fit 
mother, and that the trailer in which she was living, while crowded, 
was clean and safe. 19 The Barnharts, aided immeasurably by the 
hostile testimony of Deb's mother, focused on Deb's troubled past, 
13. Karen Silkwood, played by Meryl Streep in the biographical film Silkwood, was a 
union activist and whistle blower known for her efforts in investigating and exposing 
the appalling health and safety standards at her place of employment, the Kerr-
McGee Nuclear Corporation, in the Kerr-McGee Plutonium Case. See generally 
RICHARD RASHKE, THE KILLING OF KAREN SILKWOOD: THE STORY BEHIND THE KERR-
MCGEE PLUTONIUM CASE (1981); see also SILKWOOD (Twentieth Century Fox 1983). 
14. Norma Rae is a movie heroine, played by Sally Field, who leads the effort to 
unionize the textile mill where she works. Christopher David Ruiz Cameron, The 
Labyrinth of Solidarity: Why the Future of the American Labor Movement Depends 
on Latino Workers, 53 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1089, 1105 n.82 (1999). 
15. Joint Record Extract at E0050-51, E0069-72, E0136, E0190-91, Frase v. Barnhart, 
379 Md. 100,840 A.2d 114 (2003) (No.6). 
16. Id. at E050-51. 
17. See Frase, 379 Md. at 105,840 A.2d at 116-17. 
18. Joint Record Extract, supra note 15, at E0400, E0419, E0423, E0436. 
19. Id. at E0094, E0097, EOIOO-OI, EOI03, E0224-25, E0230, E0245, E0247. 
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her earlier bouts with drugs and alcohol, some minor scrapes with the 
law, and her lousy parenting of her oldest son during her teenage 
years. 20 
I must point out here that nine years earlier, Deb Frase consented to 
relinquish legal custody of that oldest son, then her only child, to her 
mother.2l The court file in that proceeding reveals that Ms. Keys, the 
mother, made the same allegations then that she was now making 
before the master-<irugs, alcohol, and bad parenting. 22 The court 
file also reveals that Ms. Keys's attorney in the earlier matter was the 
same master now adjudicating Deb's case!23 But, neither the master 
nor Ms. Keys, or even the counsel for the Barnharts disclosed that 
fact. Deb Frase was ignorant of this and didn't discover it until she 
examined the earlier court file for the first time after the hearing 
before the master and the circuit court hearing on her exceptions. 
Deb Frase testified that she had made, as she put it, some "bad 
choices" earlier in her life, but asserted she was recovering and 
'bl 24 responsl e now. 
The hearing before the master was a parody of the adversary 
process. 
She conducted no pretrial discovery and didn't know she could. 
Her attempts at research in the Denton's courthouse library didn't 
lead her to the dispositive Troxel case until after all the hearings were 
over. She cited it for the first time in a final, desperate pleading-an 
emergency motion occasioned by her belated discovery of the 
master's previous representation of her mother. 25 
She had no understanding of how to introduce evidence or what an 
expert witness was. 
She frequently expressed bewilderment and apologized for it. 
Her cross examination of her mother-the central witness against 
her-was in shambles and amounted to little more than an exchange 
of accusations. 26 
She was never able to challenge the posture of the Barnharts as 
Good Samaritans who, in a mere six weeks, had purportedly 
established a loving and warm relationship with Brett Michael. She 
was also unable to question their motives; the reason for the plethora 
20. Brief of Appellant at 31, Frase, 379 Md. 100,840 A.2d 114 (No.6). 
21. Id.at3. 
22. Id. at IS. 
23. See, e.g., Joint Record Extract, supra note IS, at E043S. 
24. Id. at E0268. It is worthy of note that Deb had been abused by her father over a six-
month period when she was a teenager; he committed suicide shortly thereafter. 
2S. Id. at E0434-3S. 
26. Id. at EOI46-S9. 
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of biological, foster, and adopted children who choked their home; or 
the living conditions in their home, all of which begged for testing. 
Hearsay was rampant and was admitted without objection.27 Her 
direct testimony was little more than a response to cursory questions 
from the master. 28 
At root, Deb Frase was never able to overcome the shadow that her 
admittedly troubled past cast on her present parenting abilities. She 
was never able to achieve, as any trained advocate would have, a 
coherent presentation distinguishing fact from supposition and 
prejudice or demonstrating a change over the decade from then to 
now. 
Although the master found, as the evidence compelled, that Deb 
Frase was, at present, a fit parent and denied the Barnharts' custody 
request, she nonetheless recommended the restrictive custodial 
conditions I have mentioned. 29 Her report, moreover, made explicit 
her deep distrust of Deb, her scornful prediction that Deb would fail 
as a parent, and her regret that the law did not allow her to award 
custody to the Barnharts. 3o 
Deb Frase fared no better before the circuit court. The judge-who 
took no testimony, listened to no tapes, and read no transcript-
essentially adopted the master's report. 31 She expressed gratitude 
that the Barnharts "were there as a safety net for [her] family.,,32 
And she turned the Troxel constitutional presumption on its head, 
saying "unless you can tell me something about the Barnharts that 
would suggest that they wouldn't be adequate supervisors, it's falling 
on deaf ears.,,33 
On appeal, the Court of Appeals of Maryland majority reversed, as 
I have said, on Troxel grounds. It didn't reach the recusal issue, but 
27. IdatE0032,E0040, E0042. 
28. See generally Reporter's Official Transcript of Proceedings, Master's Hearing, 
Barnhart v. Frase, Civ. No. 7764 (Cir. Ct. for Caroline County, Md. May 20, 2002), 
reprinted in Joint Record Extract, supra note 15, at E0076-82. 
29. Frase v. Barnhart, 379 Md. 100, 106,840 A.2d 114, 117 (2003); see also Report and 
Recommendation of Master, Barnhart v. Frase, Civ. No. 7764 (Cir. Ct. for Caroline 
County, Md. June 4, 2002), reprinted in Joint Record Extract, supra note 15, at 
E0398-99. 
30. Report and Recommendation of Master, supra note 29, at E0398. 
31. Frase, 379 Md. at 106, 840 A.2d at 117; see also Reporter's Official Transcript of 
Proceedings, Hearing on Exceptions, Barnhart v. Frase, Civ. No. 7764 (Cir. Ct. for 
Caroline County, Md. Sept. 13, 2002), reprinted in Joint Record Extract, supra note 
15, at E0321-23. 
32. Reporter's Official Transcript of Proceedings, Hearing on Exceptions, supra note 31, 
at E0342. 
33. ld 
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sent a strong message to the master to review her ethical obligations. 
The right to counsel issue was, of course, entirely moot as to Deb 
Frase, and the court majority was unwilling to use this occasion to 
give right to counsel guidance to others similarly situated. It was this 
decision to not decide that Judge Cathell's concurrence, joined in by 
Chief Judge Bell and Judge Eldridge, protested. 34 
In any case, there is no Civil Gideon in Maryland. At least ... not 
yet. 
* * * 
"Gideon," of course refers to Gideon v. Wainwright,35 the 1963 
case in which Clarence Earl Gideon, prisoner number 003826 in the 
Florida State Prison, whose handwritteI) petition to the Supreme 
Court saying he should have had appointed counsel in his trial for 
petty larceny, led to one ofthe defining moments in our constitutional 
history. 
Gideon held that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, through its incorporation of the Sixth Amendment, 
required the ap~ointment of counsel for indigent criminal defendants 
in state courts. 6 Justice Black's "moving words," drawn largely 
from the language of the old Scottsboro case, remain the hymn-the 
old time religion-for those of us who would apply the logic of 
Gideon to civil litigation: 
The right to be heard would be, in many cases, of little avail 
if it did not comprehend the right to be heard by counsel. 
Even the intelligent and educated layman has small and 
sometimes no skill in the science of the law .... He is 
unfamiliar with the rules of evidence .... He lacks both the 
skill and knowledge adequately to prepare his defense, even 
though he have a perfect one. He requires the guiding hand 
of counsel at every step in the proceedings against 
him .... 37 
"This seems to us to be an obvious truth," Justice Black wrote, that 
"any person haled into court, who is too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot 
be assured a fair trial unless counsel is provided for him. ,,38 In such 
circumstances, "lawyers," he wrote, "are necessities, not luxuries.,,39 
34. Frase, 379 Md. at 129-30,840 A.2d at 131 (Cathell, J., concurring). 
35. 372 U.S. 335 (1963). 
36. Id. at 343. 
37. Id. at 344-45 (quoting Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68--69 (1932)). 
38. Id. at 344. 
39. Id. 
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Alas, eighteen years later, the Supreme Court decided Lassiter v. 
Department of Social Services,4o which held that a North Carolina 
mother fighting the State of North Carolina's effort to terminate her 
parental rights was not entitled to an appointed counsel. 41 A five-to-
four majority of the Court tied Gideon to its Sixth Amendment 
moorings and erected a presumption that an indigent civil litigant has 
a right to appointed counsel only when, if she loses, she may be 
deprived of her physical liberty."2 The presumption is rebuttable 
only after applying a restrictive balancing test on a case-by-case 
basis. 
What to do? To repair to state constitutions, that's what. In 
particular to the Constitution of Maryland, which is older and better 
than the one those Framers wrote in Philadelphia in 1787. 
* * * 
III. A FEW OBVIOUS PROPOSITIONS 
Before I get to the doctrine, I want to set out a few unremarkable-
and I think incontestable-propositions that give practical 
significance and importance to the state constitutional doctrines on 
which I rely. 
First, a lawyer is a pretty important thing to have in litigation. 
That's why people who can afford them usually hire them. 
Lawyers make a difference. It is worth recalling that the second 
time around, after Clarence Earl Gideon got his court appointed 
lawyer, he was acquitted. 43 
That's why the presence of counsel in Maryland's administrative 
proceedings, for example, doubles claimants' success rates in 
overturning agency decisions. 
That's why battered women who had an attorney were successful in 
getting a protective order 83% of the time, while only 32% of 
battered women without an attorney obtained an order. 44 
That's why judges are required to be scrupulous in making sure 
that waivers oflawyers in criminal cases are voluntary. 
40. 452 U.S. 18 (1981). 
41. [d. at 31. This was not an ideal test case. Ms. Lassiter was in prison for double 
murder at the time and had no significant track record for motherly love. [d. at 18. 
42. [d. at 26-27. 
43. ANTHONY LEWIS, GIDEON'S TRUMPET 249 (1964). 
44. Sarah M. Buel, Effective Assistance of Counsel for Battered Women Defendants: A 
Normative Construct, 26 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 217, 250-51 (2003). 
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And that's why, on the forms published by the Court of Appeals of 
Maryland's Administrative Office of the Courts, pro se litigants in 
contested custody cases like Deb Frase's are warned that they need a 
lawyer if the other side has one and are "urged to consider carefully 
the importance of getting an attorney to help you. Custody, if 
contested, is one of the most difficult types of cases and you should 
consider seriously using an attorney.,,45 
IV. THE DOCTRINE 
We Civil Gideon advocates argue that the Constitution of Maryland 
mandates appointment of counsel for indigent civil litigants, at least 
in cases, like Deborah Frase's, that touch fundamental rights and 
basic human needs. 
Over a hundred years ago, a Yale Law Journal article about 
Maryland constitutional law observed that one of the axioms of our 
constitutional history is "[t]hat the colonists carried with them the 
rights of Englishmen, when they crossed the Atlantic .... ,,46 Indeed, 
some of the provisions we rely on reach back to Tudor England and, 
earlier still, to Magna Carta. In short, the right of an indigent civil 
litigant. to appointed counsel is a right that has deep roots in 
Maryland's constitutional soil. 
A. Article XIX 
I want to begin by discussing Article XIX of our Declaration of 
Rights. Article XIX provides: 
That every man, for any injury done to him in his person 
or property, ought to have remedy by the course of the Law 
of the land, and ought to have justice and right, freely 
without sale, fully without any denial, and speedily without 
delay, according to the Law of the land.47 
It flows directly, with some cadenzas by Lord Coke and Blackstone, 
from Magna Carta's chapter 40: "To no one will we sell, to no one 
will we refuse or delay, right or justice,,,48 which was written to 
reform the sale of writs, documents that opened access to the courts, 
45. INSTRUCTIONS ON COMPLETING A COMPLAINT FOR CUSTODY I (rev. ed. 2005), 
http://www.courts.state.md.us/family/forms/drin04.pdf (this is a commonly used civil 
domestic case information report). 
46. Bernard C. Steiner, The Adoption of English Law in Maryland, 8 YALE L.J. 353, 353 
(1899). 
47. MD. CON ST. DECL. OF RTS. art. XIX. 
48. MAGNA CARTA ch. 40, reprinted in WILLIAM SHARP MCKECHNIE, MAGNA CARTA: A 
COMMENTARY ON THE GREAT CHARTER OF KING JOHN 395 (2d ed. 1914). 
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during the reigns of Henry II and good King John, and has been 
interpreted "as a universal guarantee of impartial justice to high and 
low .... ,,49 Blackstone wrote of Magna Carta's guarantee of access 
to the courts. 50 As Professor Howard has put it, Magna Carta 
mandated that "justice is not something to be sold to the highest 
bidder but should be available on impartial terms to men of all 
ranks.,,51 
Magna Carta has become the template for the so-called "open 
courts," "access to courts," and "remedies" provisions like Article 
XIX, which has counterparts in about forty other states. 52 
Significantly, it has no counterpart in the federal constitution. Most 
of the jurisprudence under these proVISIons concerns the 
reasonableness of legislation that limits access to the courts in some 
way-legislation, for example, requiring arbitration of medical 
malpractice claims, statutes of limitations, and repose. 
True, no court has found, so far, that open courts provisions 
mandate appointment of counsel for the indigent civil litigant. Nor, 
to my knowledge, has any state court yet directly addressed the issue. 
But, we argue, the promise of access to the courts-in the most 
litigious society on the face of the earth-is meaningless unless it 
contemplates access with counsel. 
This is not a startling proposition. 
We remember that warning on the forms that were provided to pro 
se litigants by our own Administrative Office of the Courts. 
We have been reminded by the Maryland Commission on Pro Bono 
(the Cardin Commission) that "[m]any of Maryland's poor lack 
meaningful access to the civil justice system because they cannot 
afford a lawyer.,,53 . 
We agree with Justice Black, who observed that in the civil 
context, "there cannot be meaningful access to the judicial process 
until every serious litigant is represented by competent counsel. ,,54 
49. MCKECHNIE, supra note 48, at 398. 
50. See I WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 137 
(Oxford, Clarendon Press 1765-69) ("[ c ]ourts of justice must at all times be open to 
the subject .... ") (alteration of original). 
51. A.E. DICK HOWARD, MAGNA CARTA: TEXT AND COMMENTARY IS (1964). 
52. John H. Bauman, Remedies Provisions in State Constitutions and the Proper Role of 
State Courts, 26 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 237,237-38 (1991). 
53. THE MARYLAND JUDICIAL COMMISSION ON PRO BONO: REpORT AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS vi (2000), http://www.courts.state.md.us/probono.pdf. 
54. Meltzer v. C. Buck LeCraw & Co., 402 U.S. 954, 959 (1971) (Black, J., dissenting 
from denial of certiorari). 
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We agree with Judge Robert Sweet of the Southern District of New 
York: "[W]e need a civil Gideon-that is, an expanded constitutional 
right to counsel in civil matters."ss 
We can appreciate the caustic observation of California's Justice 
Earl Johnson who wrote that saying that mere physical presence in 
the courtroom is "access" is like saying that earl~ Christians being 
thrown to the lions had "access" to the Colosseum. 6 
In short, the logic that supports the holding of Gideon-that the 
right to be heard means little without the right to be heard by counsel, 
and that lawyers are necessities, not luxuries-is often as applicable 
to civil cases as it is to criminal ones. Fairness is not a function of 
the label on the proceedings. A trial is either fair or not. Gideon's 
doctrine may not support the civil right, but its logic sure does. 
Deborah Frase, like Clarence Gideon, had no skill "in the science 
of law,,,s7 she, like Gideon, was unfamiliar with the rules of 
evidence; faced with the need to interview and examine witnesses, to 
assess relevance, to advocate controlling le~al issues she, like 
Gideon, needed "the guiding hand of counsel."s It is of no practical 
consequence that an assistant state's attorney was not her opponent; 
she faced a trained practitioner who made his living in the very courts 
in which she was an alien. And the stakes? It seems to me 
incontestable that the threatened loss of a child is an incomparably 
greater life shattering event than thirty days for shoplifting. 
To put this in historic context, perhaps we should say that Deb 
Frase's inability to get a lawyer, and the inability of thousands of the 
poor in Maryland's courtrooms every day, hurting as badly as she and 
frequently worse, is the twenty-first century equivalent of being 
unable to buy a writ. 
In short, Article XIX's promise of access cannot be fulfilled and 
cannot be redeemed, in many civil cases, without the appointment of 
counsel for the indigent civil litigant. 
There is a second aspect of Article XIX's provenance that should 
be underscored and supports our contention that appointed counsel 
for the poor is essential to give it meaning. 
Article XIX, and the Magna Carta provision from which it grew, is 
not only about unobstructed access to courts by private citizens. 
55. Hon. Robert W. Sweet, Civil Gideon and Confidence in a Just Society, 17 YALE L. & 
POL'y REv. 503, 503 (1998). 
56. Earl Johnson, Jr., Thrown to the Lions: A Plea for a Constitutional Right to Counsel 
for Low-Income Civil Litigants, BAR LEADER, Sept.-Oct. 1976, at 17. 
57. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 345 (1963). 
58. !d. 
2007) Civil Gideon - Keynote Address 15 
It is also a statement of judicial independence, judicial power and, 
uniquely, judicial responsibility. It is judiciary centered. As the 
highest court of another state has said of its counterpart to 
Maryland's Article XIX: it was "directed at the courtS."S9 As many 
commentators and courts have pointed out, these "open courts," 
"access," or "remedy clauses," rooted in Magna Carta and especially 
those cadenzas of Coke and Blackstone, were precursors of the then 
infant idea of separation of powers, captured in Article VIII of our 
Declaration of Rights, and of an independent judiciary. 60 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland has "been there," so to speak, 
before, nearly thirty years ago, in its searching discussion of the 
judicial function and judicial independence in Attorney General v. 
Waldron. 61 It's a case that I believe bears directly on the power of 
Maryland's courts to appoint counsel, and their responsibility to do 
so, in order to fulfill the unfulfilled promise of access of Article 
XIX. 62 
In Waldron, the Court of Appeals of Maryland held that the 
General Assembly's effort to prevent retired judges from practicing 
law if they accepted judicial pensions was an unconstitutional attempt 
by the legislature to regulate the legal profession, which the court 
held was the province of the judiciary under Article VIII. 63 It is 
instructive to examine the court's reasoning. 
It asserted that each branch of government possessed powers 
implied "from the right and obligation to perform its constitutional 
duties. ,,64 
It spoke of the courts' "constitutionall~ imposed responsibility with 
respect to the administration of justice." 5 
It asserted flatly that the judicial branch had an obligation "to 
monitor and manage its own house.,,66 In a passage that inescapably 
speaks to the issues raised in a right to appointed counsel claim, 
Judge J. Dudley Digges explained the "unique relationship" between 
59. Meech v. Hillhaven W., Inc., 776 P.2d 488, 492 (Mont. 1989). 
60. MD. CaNST. DECL. OF RTS. art. Vlll; 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 50, at 69; Jonathan 
M. Hoffman, By the Course of the Law: The Origins of the Open Courts Clause of 
State Constitutions, 74 OR. L. REV. 1279, 1279, 1312(1995). 
61. 289 Md. 683, 688-89, 695, 426 A.2d 929, 933, 936 (1981). 
62. See MD. CaNST. DECL. OF RTS. art. XIX. 
63. Waldron, 289 Md. at 690--92, 697-98, 728-29,426 A.2d at 933-35,937,954. 
64. Id. at 690, 426 A.2d at 933-34. 
65. Id. at 692, 426 A.2d at 934. 
66. Id. at 695, 426 A.2d at 936. 
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bar and bench 67 and the need for effective lawyering to make the 
adversary system work: 
In this country, it is a well known maxim that attorneys 
function as officers of the courts, and, as such, are a 
necessary and important adjunct to the administration of 
justice. This truism necessarily derives, in our view, from 
the very theory of the structure of our system of justice. 
The adversary process integral to the design of our 
dispute-resolving scheme is perhaps one of the more 
remarkable accomplishments of western jurisprudence. It is 
this process, whereby truth is garnered from the articulation 
of opposing points of view, that is the preeminent tool 
through which fairness is achieved in the administration of 
justice in this country. 
Without a vigorous, honorable and qualified bar, the 
judiciary of this State, to put it quite simply, would be 
greatly handicapped if not comRletely incapable of 
performing those duties assigned to it. 68 
True, there is nothing in the Waldron holding that directly 
addresses the issue of appointment of counsel for the indigent. 69 
And Waldron is not, strictly speaking, an Article XIX case. 70 
But Waldron focused on the key role of lawyers in making the 
adversary system effective and, above all, stressed the ~ower and the 
responsibility of the judiciary to manage its own house. I 
Waldron, thus, is very strong support for my contention that 
Maryland courts should interpret Article XIX to require appointment 
of counsel for indigent civil litigants, at least in basic needs cases, in 
order to discharge their responsibility to make the adversary system 
function properly. 72 
67. ld. 
68. ld. at 695-96, 426 A.2d at 936-37 (emphasis added). 
69. See id. at 684, 426 A.2d at 931 (addressing specifically only the issues of whether a 
statute prohibiting a former judge from practicing law for compensation violates 
separation of powers and whether that same statute itself violates separation of 
powers). 
70. See id. 
71. Id. at 695, 426 A.2d at 936. 
72. See id. at 695-96, 426 A.2d at 936-37. 
2007) Civil Gideon - Keynote Address 17 
B. ARTICLE V 
The most explicit recognition of the indigent's right to appointed 
counsel stems from Article V of the Declaration of Rights, which 
provides in relevant part: 
That the Inhabitants of Maryland are entitled to the 
Common Law of England ... and to the benefit of such of 
the English statutes as existed on the Fourth day of July, 
[1776]; and which, by experience, have been found 
applicable to their local and other circumstances, and have 
been introduced, used and practiced by the Courts of Law or 
Equity. .. subject, nevertheless, to the revision of, and 
amendment or repeal by, the Legislature of this State. 73 
Among those "rights of Englishmen" was the Tudor statute 11 Hen. 
VII, ch. 12, which established a right to appointed counsel for 
indigent civil plaintiffs with meritorious causes of action. 74 Its 
purpose was to ensure that those indigent civil litigants, who would 
have been unable to navigate the baroque writ system without 
assistance, had access to the King's courts. The Hen. VII statute 
commands that: 
Indifferent Justice to be had ... as well to the poor as to the 
rich. . . of it be afore the King in his Bench, the Justices 
there shall assign to the same poor person or persons 
Counsel learned by their discretions which shall give their 
Counselees nothing taking for the same, and in like wise ... 
shall appoint attorney and attorneys for the same poor 
person and persons ... which shall do their duties without 
any rewards for their Counselees help and business in the 
75 same .... 
Under 11 Hen. VII the chancellor merely determined whether a 
party was indigent; whether he would swear himself worth less than 
five pounds. 76 Once the chancellor determined that the party was 
indigent, the statute required the appointment of counsel. 
73. MD. CONST. DECL. OF RTS. art. V(a). 
74. Michael Milleman, Mandatory Pro Bono in Civil Cases: A Partial Answer to the 
Right Question, 49 MD. L. REV. 18,42-43 (1990). 
75. II HEN. 7, ch. 12 (1495), reprinted in 2 STATUTES OF THE REALM 578 (1816), 
microformed on Microcard No. 55E53 (Matthew Bender & Co.) (alteration of 
original) (emphasis added). 
76. 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 400 (Oxford, 
Clarendon Press 1765-69). 
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The Hen. VII statute was incorporated as part of the common law 
of Maryland. This we know because Chancellor Kilty tells us so. In 
1809 the General Assembly asked William Kilty, then chancellor of 
Maryland (and a brooding omnipresence who hovers over Maryland 
legal history) to inform it which English statutes were proper to be 
incorporated into Maryland law. Among those· statutes that Kilty 
found had been introduced, used, and practiced in the Maryland 
colony, and applicable to Maryland's circumstances was the Hen. VII 
statute. 77 
Although the Court of Appeals of Maryland has frequently 
addressed Kilty's findings concerning the incorporation of English 
statutes pursuant to Article V, it has never rejected such a finding. 
And, the General Assembly has never revised, amended or repealed 
the Hen. VII statute. 
Kilty was not called upon to opine on what aspects of the English 
common law were incorporated via Article V. But as the Court of 
Appeals of Maryland has held, "the mass of the common law as it 
existed in England" at the American Revolution, unless it was 
inconsistent with our institutions, was also incorporated by Article 
V. 78 And it is clear from at least a dozen old English cases that the 
right to appointed counsel was recognized by English common law 
even prior to the Tudor statute, and that the right extended to 
defendants who were paupers as well as plaintiffs. 79 
Legitimate questions arise about the applicability of the Hen. VII 
statute. Where has it been all these years? Can the legislature really 
repeal it? Does it apply to defendants as well as plaintiffs? How on 
earth can we apply the "five pounds and the clothes on your back" 
test to the twenty-first century? These important issues, and others, 
deserve consideration. We can expect that when the Court of 
Appeals of Maryland eventually addresses the aFoplicability of the 
Hen. VII statute, they will be thoroughly explored. 0 
77. A REpORT OF ALL SUCH ENGLISH STATUTES AS EXISTED AT THE TIME OF THE FIRST 
EMIGRATION OF THE PEOPLE OF MARYLAND, AND WHICH BY EXPERIENCE HAVE BEEN 
FOUND APPLICABLE TO THEIR LOCAL AND OTHER CIRCUMSTANCES; AND OF SUCH 
OTHERS AS HAVE SINCE BEEN MADE IN ENGLAND OR GREAT-BRITAIN, AND HAVE BEEN 
INTRODUCED, USED AND PRACTISED, BY THE COURTS OF LAW OR EQUITY; AND ALSO 
ALL SUCH PARTS OF THE SAME AS MAY BE PROPER TO BE INTRODUCED AND 
INCORPORATED INTO THE BODY OF THE STATUTE LAW OF THE STATE 229 (1811) 
[hereinafter A REpORT OF ALL SUCH ENGLISH STATUTES]' 
78. Gladden v. State, 273 Md. 383, 389, 330 A.2d 176, 180 (1974). 
79. See, e.g., Wiat v. Farthing, 84 Eng. Rep. 237 (K.B. 1668). 
80. These issues are addressed and relevant authorities are collected in Brief of 
Appellant, supra note 20, at 33-42. 
2007) Civil Gideon - Keynote Address 19 
C. Article XXIV 
Article XXIV provides in relevant part, "That no man ought to 
be ... deprived of his life, liberty or rroperty, but by the judgment of 
his peers, or by the Law of the land." 1 
Article XXIV is Maryland's guarantee of due process, which 
ensures a fair hearing. Many believe that, while the Supreme Court's 
Lassiter decision is' our law of the land, Article XXIV is not as 
reliable as support for a Maryland Civil Gideon as are Articles XIX 
and V. But, several supportive features concerning Article XXIV are 
relevant. 
First, while it is true that Article XXIV is to be construed in pari 
materia with its federal counterpart and is thus subject to the 
restrictive case-by-case balancing test of Lassiter, the Court of 
Appeals of Maryland has recently reminded us that in pari materia 
does not require Maryland to slavishly follow every interpretation of 
the federal provisions by the Supreme Court. 82 
Second, the interpretation of Article XXIV to include the right to 
appointed counsel for the poor in civil cases involving fundamental 
rights or human needs, draws additional support from those 
companion Declaration of Rights provisions, Articles XIX and V, 
which, as we have seen, have no counterpart in the federal 
constitution. The provenance of these three provisions is nearly 
identical. They were written by drafters schooled on the works of 
Coke and Blackstone, who also knew, as Kilty observed, that 
appointed counsel for the poor was "being [used and] practi[ c ]ed" in 
the Maryland colony. 83 The drafters of Article XXIV had plenty of 
reason to believe that the Law of the land, at least in Maryland, 
incorporated a right to appointed civil counsel for the poor. 
*** 
V. CONCLUSION 
So where do we Marylanders stand? We continue to search for the 
best test case, "Frase II." Meanwhile, several judges of the Court of 
Appeals of Maryland, including Chief Judge Bell, have indicated 
judicial approval of some form of the right. 84 But it seems 
81. Mo, CONST. DECL. OF RTS. art. XXIV. 
82. See, e.g., Dua v. Comcast Cable, 370 Md. 604, 621, 805 A.2d 1061, 1071(2002). 
83. A REpORT OF ALL SUCH ENGLISH STATUTES, supra note 77, at 229. 
84. See, e.g., Touzeau v. Deffinbaugh, 394 Md. 654, 687-89, 907 A.2d 807, "827-28 
(2006) (Bell, c.J., dissenting) (supporting the right of low-income people to counsel 
at public expense in adversarial proceedings where basic human needs are at stake). 
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appropriate to give the last word today to Judge Cathell, author of an 
eloquent concurring opinion in Frase: 
[T]his issue will not go away. . .. This issue will keep 
coming back. .. until four judges of this Court vote to 
resolve it one way or the other. The bullet will have to be 
bitten .... The poor need a yes or a no. 
I am fully aware of the consequences of taking the first 
step onto the path of a civil Gideon. But the right we are 
asked to afford in the context of this case, addresses the 
most fundamental of rights. It is not in the nature of a 
speeding ticket, a civil violation of a zoning ordinance, a 
tortious interference with contract, or a breach of contract 
case. In my view, it is much more fundamental, much more 
important. It is in the nature of the protection of the family. 
What can be more important? We should all try to imagine 
how it must feel to be utterly poor and to receive a summons 
from the hands of a sheriff informing us that we are required 
to appear in court because either the State or some third 
party is attempting to terminate our paternal rights, or to 
interfere with them, and we don't have any money with 
which to hire a lawyer. The poor face fears without the 
security of the money that many others have. And it can be 
terrifying, to realize how helpless you are when others are 
attempting to take your children from you. 85 
85. Frase v. Barnhart, 379 Md. 100, 140-41, 840 A.2d 114, 138 (2003) (Cathell, J., 
concurring). 
